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Sunday, February 7, 2010

The Schmittian Response

I had a difficult time with the exercise we did in class on Thursday. My group, four, had to argue that earthlings would not and should not react according to Schmitt's model in the event of an alien invasion. Schmitt's model, as far as I understand it, is general enough to be difficult to escape. Acting outside of the framework would mean classifying an "other" as neither friend or enemy. That other would have to be something akin to a plague or natural disaster, a truly nonpolitical other. The way I see it, humanity would have no choice other than to make the judgment of friend or foe, and I wouldn't be surprised if we leaned more towards designating them as the enemy.

According to Schmitt, the distinction of enemy comes out of a difference between the parties:
"... it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible..." (27)
A group does not become an enemy simply by being envious of another's territory, but because of the perceived differences in the groups that would enable them to fight and kill for it. By Schmitt's definition, an alien would almost certainly fall under the category of "existentially something different and alien," and would therefore become the enemy. Following Schmitt's method, it would then be nearly impossible for an extraterrestrial to be treated as anything but an enemy.

So what would it mean to act against Schmitt's logic? I see an inconsistency. In one paragraph, Schmitt claims that an enemy is someone different with whom conflict could arise, and in another, "An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity." He is saying two different things here. As brought up in class (thanks Phil!), we probably have plans for invading Britain, or Canada. There's a potential that we might fight them, therefore they are our enemies. If not even Canada counts as a friend, than I think it is safe to say that we only have enemies, and Schmitt's model stops meaning much of anything. Schmitt's framework is really only useful when you take into account the "existential differences" between groups.

The question becomes, would we, should we, treat extraterrestrials as enemies based on their differences, regardless of other factors. I still come to the conclusion that we would do so. Should we? I don't think so. We can discuss that further when we get to Speaker for the Dead which introduces another classification system into the mix.

1 comment:

  1. I think acting outside of a Schmittian philosophy doesn't necessarily preclude classification of an unknown party as either a friend or enemy - there's more to it than that. Part of Schmitt's politican philosophy is the actual definition of friend and enemy. I feel as though Schmitt defines the "friend" negatively, and as you point out, not necessarily consistently. I think acting outside of a Schmittian philosophy allows for far more "grey" areas, where these other groups of individuals aren't necessarily friends, and aren't necessarily enemies, and I think this reflects modern politics far better than the black and white world of Schmitt.

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